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Abstract 
 
The wildfire risk in Europe is increasing, as is the geographic expansion of wildfires to north and south-
east Europe. When wildfires intersect with hazardous industry in Wildland Industrial Interfaces, they 
can trigger toxic spills, fires or explosions. Climate change and the associated transformation of the 
surroundings of industrial installations raise concerns about future industrial plant safety in wildfire 
zones, as external hazards can also be carried into industrial sites. However, there is no integrated 
European fire management system that would meet the requirements for the prevention of wildfire-
triggered industrial accidents.  
This study focuses on Wildland Industrial Interfaces and analyses the vulnerability of European 
industrial sites to wildfires based on current scientific knowledge and international initiatives. It also 
makes recommendations for policy makers, industry, emergency responders and academia on how to 
close existing risk management gaps. Past data shows that there have already been incidents due to 
wildfires, confirming that this hazard has the potential to increasingly cause damage to technological 
systems in the future. If no appropriate protection measures are implemented, wildfires can harm 
industrial facilities via thermal radiation (heat), ember flight or direct flame impingement to industrial 
infrastructure or process equipment. Since the necessary level of safety can only be reached by an 
integrated risk management approach involving all stakeholders, concerted action of policy makers, 
industry, emergency responders and science is required. 
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Executive summary 
 
Climate change is accompanied by different social and environmental effects. One of these effects is 
the observed increase in the number and intensity of wildfires in Europe, as well as their geographic 
expansion to north and south-eastern Europe. When wildland intersects with communities (urban or 
suburban) or industrial zones, these areas are called “Wildland Urban Interfaces (WUI)” or “Wildland 
Industrial Interfaces (WII)”. There, wildfires can trigger disasters or cascading events around critical 
infrastructure, industrial complexes or hazardous sites with major accident potential via thermal 
radiation (heat), ember flight or direct flame impingement to industrial infrastructure or process 
equipment. This can lead to toxic spills, fires or explosions. Accidents involving hazardous-materials 
releases triggered by natural hazards are also called Natech accidents. 
In the past, emphasis was put on protecting vulnerable wildland and forest areas from environmental 
damage due to industrial activities via adequate land use planning, as e.g. required by the European 
Seveso III Directive on the control of major accident hazards. However, climate change and the 
associated transformation of the surroundings of industrial installations raise concerns about future 
industrial plant safety in wildfire zones, as external hazards can also be carried into industrial sites. 
The Seveso III Directive in principle covers such external hazards, however, there is no integrated 
European fire management system that would meet the requirements for the prevention of wildfire-
triggered Natech accidents. An in-depth analysis of the impacts of climate change on hazardous 
industrial facilities and their potential to cause Natech events is therefore necessary.  
This study focuses on Wildland Industrial Interfaces and attempts to analyse the vulnerability of 
European industrial sites to wildfires based on current scientific knowledge and international initiatives. 
It is a first step towards establishing a detailed understanding of the risk in the EU. The study also 
makes recommendations on how to close existing risk management gaps. Past data shows that there 
have already been incidents due to wildfires, confirming that this hazard has the potential to 
increasingly cause damage to technological systems in the future. Since the necessary level of safety 
can only be reached by an integrated risk management approach involving all stakeholders, concerted 
action of policy makers, industry, emergency responders and science is required. More specifically:  
 
Policy makers should: 
● Raise awareness of the Natech risk due to wildfires and foster initiatives for multi-
stakeholder activities promoting wildfire safety. 
● Promote the development of early warning systems or models to calculate fire spread in 
ongoing fire events as well as the preparation of guidance for emergency situations in 
industrial environments to ensure proper and timely operator response (evacuation, shut 
down, etc.) 
● Develop regulations and associated guidance on land use planning in WUI and WII 
regions, as well as building standards for industry and critical infrastructure in such 
regions. 
● Improve industrial emergency response capabilities within the EU Civil Protection 
Mechanism. 
● Facilitate knowledge transfer between the stakeholder communities (e.g. via knowledge 
transfer platforms) and explore strategic investments to create scientific capability in the 
EU (e.g. modelling and simulation capacities, testing facilities, etc.). 
Industry should: 
● Liaise with neighbouring wildland and forest owners, as well as land-use and emergency 
planners to develop strategies for reducing wildfire risks near a facility and for preparing 
for impacts. 
● Evaluate facility-internal and external emergency response capabilities and improve 
capacities if necessary. 
● Develop facility shutdown policies, and define roles and responsibilities in case of a 
wildfire event. 
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● Create wildfire exclusion and protection zones around facilities, including storage 
concepts that reduce the risk of fire spreading inside a facility. 
● Evaluate industrial building and equipment vulnerability against firebrand or ember attack. 
● Be aware that even if currently not or less exposed to wildfire hazards, the situation might 
change in the future due to climate change. 
Emergency responders should: 
● Develop concepts and strategies to tackle wildfires in an around industrial facilities, 
considering the specific vulnerability of the impacted systems (e.g. reduced use of aerial 
firefighting around Seveso installations). 
● Augment capacity for responding to large wildfire events, including mobile and automated 
emergency systems, as well as capabilities to respond to a simultaneous large-scale 
wildfire and the Natech accident triggered by it. 
● Ensure means of communication under partial loss of communication systems. 
● Improve European capacities for dealing with large industrial accidents. 
Science should: 
● Enhance local wildfire behaviour modelling capabilities to provide local forecasts on fire 
spread to support appropriate operator response. 
● Better understand the interaction of industrial facilities with wildfire scenarios. 
● Develop wildfire impact models on industry to facilitate risk assessment. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The wildfire seasons of 2018 and 2019 strongly affected Europe. The countries often struck by wildfire 
in the south of the European continent were subject to major fire events, but also the northern 
Scandinavian peninsula was affected by serious wildfires in 20181.  
Over the last decades numerous natural-hazard triggered technological accidents involving the 
release of hazardous substances, fires and explosions have been reported (Krausmann et al., 2017). 
These so-called “Natech” events and their management have been an ongoing topic within the 
research activities of the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC). With respect to the 
effects of climate change, these activities are becoming more and more important for adequate Natech 
accident prevention and emergency management around European industrial sites. This is especially 
true for regions where wildfires have been a negligible threat until now.  
Whenever wildfires intersect with communities or industrial areas specific hazards arise (Figure 1). 
Regions in which wildland meets urban or suburban areas are called “Wildland Urban Interfaces 
(WUI)”. Wildfires can also trigger disasters or cascading events around critical infrastructure, industrial 
complexes or hazard sites with major accident potential in so-called “Wildland Industrial Interfaces 
(WII)”. These are areas in the near vicinity of wildfire regions where technological accidents might be 
triggered by wildfires (Johnston and Flannigan, 2018). 
Figure 1. Extensive wildfires approaching urban areas (“The Tomahawk Fire”, California, 2014) 
 
Source: Pixabay 
In the past, emphasis was placed on protecting vulnerable wildland and forest areas from 
environmental damage due to industrial activities by means of land use planning which is a necessary 
and important step in many policies like the Seveso III directive on the control of major accident 
hazards (European Union, 2018a). Unmanaged wildland has never been seen as a danger itself, 
although the threat of wildfires is not new on the European continent. However, climate change and 
the change of the surrounding conditions also for industrial installations raise concerns about industrial 
plant safety. An in-depth analysis of the effects of climate change on facilities capable of triggering 
Natech events is therefore necessary. The analysis of wildfires just adds one more aspect to the whole 
picture of natural hazards triggering technological accidents.  
Due to the change in the nature of wildfires and the occurrence of megafires in Europe, wildfire safety 
of industrial facilities cannot be achieved only by on-site prevention and mitigation measures. Since 
 
1https://effis.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
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the threat is external to the facilities, there is a need for coordinated activities with communities and 
other stakeholders.  
In the European Union comprehensive wildfire protection initiatives are still lacking. Currently there is 
no common European policy in place to deal with the hazard of wildfires on multiple levels and across 
sectors. The European Commission issued a policy report in 2018 titled “Sparking firesmart policies in 
the EU” (European Union, 2018b). The report focuses on the need for a European wildfire strategy 
and includes issues already addressed in international initiatives. It also describes the need for a 
holistic or integrated wildfire safety approach for the EU Member States.  
Figure 2. Recommendations for policy makers from “Sparking firesmart policies in the EU” 
 
Source: European Union, 2018b 
Besides emergency management, integrated fire management consists of various other fields of 
activity that need to be addressed to reach an adequate level of safety (Figure 2). The report sees 
shifting the focus from suppression to prevention and a necessary increase in the awareness and 
preparedness of the population as one of the major challenges for European policy makers. Since 
there is a lack of policies and initiatives in several fields, the report endorses a corporate governance 
for wildfire safety and makes the following policy recommendations:  
1. Supporting cross-sectorial and multi-level governance to leverage the impact of public policies 
on wildfire risk management,  
2. Reinforcing the European Union's disaster response capacities, 
3. Supporting proactive prevention operations adapted to local socio-economic and 
environmental contexts,  
4. Integrating fire ecology principles into fire management strategies and policies to support 
sustainable forest management,  
5. Improving preparedness through fire smart governance systems empowered by local 
communities.  
Although industry is not directly mentioned in the report, most of the topics directly apply to industry 
and critical infrastructure, as well. In order to address the threat to these technological systems 
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explicitly, the JRC has started to investigate the exposure and vulnerability of industrial sites and 
critical infrastructure to wildfires. This explorative study combines data from forecasts, industrial 
facilities, learning from ongoing initiatives as well as effects modelling. It analyses the threat of 
wildfires to hazardous industry and infrastructures from a general perspective and reviews existing 
guidance for managing the associated risk in Europe and beyond. It proposes measures for EU policy 
makers, industry, emergency responders and academia on how to best address this type of Natech 
risk. 
Note: There are different international definitions for the events described as wildfires in this report. 
Within the report the term “wildfire” will be used for any unplanned and/or uncontrolled fire affecting 
natural, cultural, industrial and residential landscapes. It therefore also covers events referred to as 
forest fires, bushfires, wildland fires, landscape fires or any other fire events fitting into this definition.  
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2 Selected Case Studies of Accidents Triggered by Wildfires 
 
Like other Natech accidents, Natechs triggered by wildfires can lead to a variety of events, depending 
on the infrastructure or installation they intersect with (Krausmann et. al, 2017). Analysing past 
accidents and near misses, it can be seen that some industrial branches are more prone to the wildfire 
danger than others. Especially installations placed in very remote areas surrounded by vegetation are 
more endangered by wildfires than industrial sites in more urbanized areas. This is especially true for 
oil and gas installations, the raw materials industry, storage facilities or military installations. 
Due to the type of operation and the various roles industrial installations play in our society, also the 
effects of large wildfires can differ massively. Some events pose more risk in a societal context, others 
have huge impacts on the environment even in a long-term perspective. The following short case 
studies can be seen as examples for the variety of scenarios that might be triggered by wildfires.  
2.1 Water supply network 
In November 2017 the Californian city of Santa Rosa issued a warning due to groundwater 
contamination with benzene in some areas of the city2. The origin of the contamination was a severe 
wildfire going on in the area that affected the water supply system of the community. The intense fire3 
damaged the plastic tubing and released contaminants into the water. The recovery of the water 
supply system took around one year4. The Santa Rosa incident shows that vital urban infrastructure 
can be severely affected by large wildfires. This does not necessarily refer only to toxicological 
problems like in the current case, but also to the issue of functionality in general. The Santa Rosa 
community was struck by wildfire already decades ago. Some publications referring to the incident 
discuss whether inadequate land use planning and the extension of the wildland urban interface in the 
area contributed to the development of the overall disaster (Roman, 2018). 
2.2 Mining and raw materials industry 
Wildfires or bushfires are a very common threat in large areas of Australia. In terms of energy supply, 
Australia is relying on coal combustion to a large extent. Coal mines with combined power plants are 
commonly used for this purpose. In 2014, the Hazelwood power plant near Melbourne was 
responsible for around 25 % of the energy supply in Victoria. The Hazelwood coal mine was directly 
linked to the power plant and produced brown coal in an open cast winning method. Open cast or 
open pit mining opens vast areas of the deposit and makes it therefore vulnerable to influencing 
factors from outside. Brown coal as combustible material is especially endangered by the hazard of 
fire. 
In the beginning of 2014, the state of Victoria faced an extensive heat wave with increasing risk of 
wildfires. On 9 February 2014, flying embers of smaller bushfires near the edges of the mining pit 
ignited the open coal seam and led to the largest mine fires in this area to this date. The fire caused a 
public emergency and affected the near town of Morwell with toxic combustion products and ash. 
Besides serious health effects to the public, the official report of the Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry 
states the following effects to the community (Teague et. al, 2014):  
“Many people and local businesses have experienced fire impacts for a range of reasons including a 
downturn in business, medical costs, veterinary costs, time taken off work, relocation from their 
homes, cleaning their homes and businesses, and possible decreases in property value.” 
In terms of emergency response, the Hazelwood mine fire required a huge combined effort of several 
different agencies. Due to the extent of the fire, different strategies in firefighting had to be applied. 
The large burning area of the mine could only be tackled using special firefighting equipment, large 
helicopters for water application and thermal imaging. The fire itself was successfully suppressed by 
the use of compressed air foam systems (CAFS). CAFS use foaming agents (surfactants) mixed with 
water and expanded with compressed air. The application requires specialized equipment and is not a 
standard firefighting technology that is available in larger numbers. The official report from Teague 
et. al (2014) described the resource effort as follows: 
 
2https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/CASANTA/bulletins/2124f16 
3https://www.pressdemocrat.com/multimedia/7567543-181/santa-rosas-tubbs-fire-spread 
4https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/CASANTA/bulletins/2124f16 
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“Fire services supplied around 200 firefighting appliances, including aircraft, tankers, pumpers, ladder 
platforms, CAFS units, thermal imaging cameras, command vehicles and support vehicles. More than 
7,000 emergency services personnel were involved in firefighting at the Hazelwood mine during 
February and March 2014. Firefighting personnel were drawn from the CFA, Metropolitan Fire Brigade 
(MFB), Department of Environment and Primary Industries (DEPI), State Emergency Service, 
Australian Capital Territory Fire and Rescue, New South Wales Fire and Rescue, Tasmanian Fire 
Services, Queensland Fire Service, GDF Suez and Air Services Australia.”  
Had a large wildfire been present simultaneously, this large number of emergency response forces 
would have put a severe strain on the overall emergency organisation. The Hazelwood mine fire was 
extinguished 45 days after its outbreak. The total cost of the fire was estimated to exceed more than 
AUD 100 million. 
2.3 Oil and gas industry 
The region of Alberta in Canada is known for its extensive oil and gas production sites. During the last 
years also the production of tar sands has increased significantly. The upstream processing of the 
crude oil is carried out in one of the several refineries in the area. During the wildfire season of 2016 
the area around Fort McMurray was significantly affected by the wildfires. Around 88,000 people had 
to be evacuated and around 2600 houses burned down. In addition to the combustion products from 
burning wood, also large amounts of toxic smoke were generated by burning homes, cars, shops, etc. 
Fort McMurray is the heart of the Canadian tar or oil sands production. For the production processes 
large amounts of solvents are necessary to be able to get hold of the final products. These solvents 
are brought to the refineries and production sites by large pipelines. Due to the remote location of the 
production sites, the pipelines cross large wildland areas. In the course of the 2016 fires, which had a 
size of over 500,000 ha5, these solvent pipelines had to be shut down partially which led to a 
significant reduction of the production rates also at the refineries. The total financial loss was around 
CAD 3.6 billion.  
Over the last decade the oil and gas industry in the Republic of Ecuador has been showing significant 
growth. Ecuador shows numerous industrial installations which interfere with the large vegetated areas 
within the country (Figure 3). In October 2018 the refinery in Esmeraldas was threatened by a wildfire 
raging in the near vicinity of the plant. The refinery and its installations are circled by dense rain forest, 
which was suffering a severe dry period in the summer of 2018. The Fire Weather Index (FWI) from 
the Global Wildfire Information System6 indicated only moderate fire danger on the day of the incident. 
Due to the fact that only 12 firefighters were available for the defence of the plant, military units were 
brought into action. The fire was extinguished within 5 hours and did not cause any damage to the 
process installations. 
2.4 Pipeline infrastructure 
In 2016 the large Aggie Creek wildfire near Fairbanks, Alaska, threatened the nearby Trans-Alaska oil 
pipeline (Figure 4). The 1287 km long Trans-Alaska oil pipeline was built from 1975 to 1977 and runs 
from Prudhoe Bay in the North of Alaska to the harbour of Valdez. The pipeline runs underground in 
many areas and is coated by fire resistant foam and an aluminium insulation. The pump stations are 
protected by heavy-duty sprinklers to keep the vegetation around the plant wet. During the Aggie 
Creek fire, the pipeline operating company decided to carry out a controlled burn approximately five 
miles along the pipeline to clear the area from combustible material7. The fire reached the pipeline but 
did not create any damage due to adequate emergency measures8. Besides the pipeline also a fibre 
optic cable was threatened but not damaged. 
In October 2018 a grass fire that was triggered by a power line endangered a natural gas pipeline in 
Bay Point California. The fire reached a construction trench and threatened a pipeline installation by 
direct flame impingement. As emergency measure around 4000 people and 1400 homes were 
evacuated. The pipeline section was depressurized and purged with nitrogen9. 
 
5https://business.financialpost.com/feature/in-the-shadow-of-the-beast-two-years-after-the-monster-fire-fort-
mcmurray-struggles-for-a-different-future 
6https://gwis.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
7https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/article/aggie-creek-fire-grows-alyeska-takes-pipeline-
precautions/2015/07/11/ 
8https://akfireinfo.com/2015/06/30/aggie-creek-fire-update-june-30/ 
9https://edition.cnn.com/2018/10/18/us/california-bay-point-grass-fire-evacuation/index.html 
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Figure 3. Refinery complex in heavily vegetated area in Esmeraldas, Republic of Ecuador 
 
Source: Google Maps, CNES/Airbus, Maxar Technologies ©2019 
Figure 4. Trans-Alaska oil pipeline running through dense wildland 
 
Source: Pixabay 
2.5 Storage areas 
In October 2018 a wildfire (grassland) caused the explosion of an underground storage tank in South 
Korea. The fire was caught on CCTV cameras and was triggered by a carelessly used sky lantern in 
the near vicinity of the plant10. The fire entered the tank farm and reached the storage tank within 
several minutes. The fire of burning gasoline raged over 17 hours and was releasing toxic smoke 
towards the city of Seoul. Close-by communities were given advice to keep windows and doors closed 
to reduce exposure to toxic fumes.  
2.6 Landfills 
During the wildfire season 2018 a landfill in Agoura, California, was set on fire due to a large wildfire in 
the area11. The major concern was possible damage to the landfill gas collection system that mainly 
 
10http://www.firedirect.net/index.php/2018/10/south-korea-oil-storage-tank-fire-put-out-after-17-hours/ 
11https://www.waste360.com/landfill-operations/calabasas-landfill-rebound-after-california-wildfires 
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consisted of large numbers of plastic tubes all over the landfill. These tubes collect landfill gases from 
the decomposition processes ongoing in the landfill and make them usable for power production. A 
second concern was the possible damage of the barrier water collection system which prevents 
leachate from entering the environment.  
The landfill staff was involved in the firefighting operations and tried to protect the power generators 
and the emergency flaring system. It was reported that the fire seemed to be manageable at the 
beginning but when the fire front approached, several spot fires occurred and the incident got out of 
control. The fire damaged around 16 km (!) of piping for environmental controls and shut the landfill 
down for several weeks.  
A representative of the landfill operator stated in an interview:  
“We have never had a major fire this devastating on any of our facilities before. We have a fire plan, 
and we have prepared as best we could by running through different scenarios. But it’s one of those 
things where you are only running war game scenarios. Until it actually happened, we were never truly 
tested.” 
2.7 Biogas parks 
In the last decades around 900012 bio gas plants were built all over Germany. These biogas plants are 
mostly connected to agricultural activities for biomass production and are often positioned along 
farmland or forest areas. The size of the biogas plants differs, and some plants are arranged in biogas 
parks with multiple single plants. Some of the biogas parks are sites with major accident potential and 
are therefore subject to the requirements stipulated by the Seveso III Directive. Figure 5 shows the 
distribution of biogas plants over Germany. 
Figure 5. Distribution of biogas plants in Germany 
 
Source: Biogasanlagen-info.de 
 
During the wildfires of 2019 in Brandenburg, Germany, a biogas plant in Flegentreu was endangered 
by an extensive wildfire13. The fire involved a former military training ground that was used for this 
purpose for over a century. The cause of the fire is still unknown. Large areas are suspected to 
contain leftover or unexploded ammunition and for emergency responders it was not possible to enter 
 
12https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/themen/wirtschaft-konsum/industriebranchen/biogasanlagen#einfuhrung 
13https://www.maz-online.de/Brandenburg/Waldbrand-bei-Jueterbog-ist-geloescht 
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the hazardous area. Emergency response had to rely on different strategies while the fire itself gained 
intensity. Local fire services and emergency response activities got overstretched and called for help 
from other regions in Germany. The event was declared a disaster following German jurisdiction. 
Besides regular emergency response capacities also the German army (Bundeswehr) was called for 
help due to its capacities for aerial firefighting and the capability of protected movement in areas 
containing leftover ammunition. The wildfire developed towards several towns in the area. As a 
precautionary measure they were evacuated for several days. 
In the course of the events the biogas plant Flegentreu was threatened by the growing fire. The park 
consists of 10 single biogas plants with an overall thermal power of 7,2 MW. The plant processes 
renewable raw materials. The plant was erected in 2007/2008 and has an overall size of around 15 
hectares. Bundeswehr tried to protect the biogas park using CH 53 helicopters with 5,000 L exterior 
water containers. Water was taken from a nearby lake. Bundeswehr helicopters were flying 480 
missions with 120 flight hours in the course of this wildfire. Bundeswehr stated that the increased need 
for aerial firefighting also stretched their capacities to a certain limit. The fire was extinguished in the 
end by extensive response efforts including multiple stakeholders. Emergency response measures 
were also supported by rain. The biogas park was not harmed in the end. 
In the aftermath of this event the German forest authority, also responsible for large forest areas on 
the army training grounds, started large forest management action14. Improvement and reconstruction 
of safe access roads for emergency services were the first measures at the army training ground 
Klietz (9000 hectares). In a long-term perspective, German forest authorities aim at fundamental 
changes in the composition of forest vegetation. It is planned to bring in more deciduous trees and to 
raise biodiversity in the forest areas to improve resistance against climate change. 
2.8 Decommissioned hazardous sites 
The Sun Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) near San Clemente, California, was at risk from 
a 25 km² wildfire in 2014. The site was closed in 2013 and is still at the stage of decommissioning. 
According to news reports, 13 employees were evacuated, the rest of the workers was busy wetting 
the vegetation within the plant to prevent the occurrence of spot fires. It was feared that a fire on the 
plant induced by the approaching wildfire might lead to a possible release of radioactive material15. 
During the 2018 California wildfires which extended over around 3900 square kilometres16, a former 
nuclear test centre was threatened by the approaching wildfires. The Santa Susana Field Laboratory is 
a former research and development laboratory for rockets and nuclear devices17. The 11.5 km² field 
laboratory was subject to nuclear accidents as well as toxic releases including a partial reactor 
meltdown in 1959. It left large amounts of contaminated installations and soil. The laboratory was 
closed in 1996, but the clean-up efforts are still in the beginning. The site lay directly in the wildfire 
zone, however, official measurements showed that no radioactive or toxic material was released.  
 
14https://www.mdr.de/sachsen-anhalt/stendal/elb-havel/forstaktion-besserer-brandschutz-
truppenuebungsplatz-klietz-100.html?fbclid=IwAR0OheWt1VjRgeveEtvuwlzqZc7UxCSJi-
JAPt_k5L3LSDFrozI5SpGWHgM 
15https://www.power-eng.com/2014/05/15/wildfires-prompt-evacuation-of-san-onofre-nuclear-plant/#gref 
16http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents_stats 
17https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/california-fire-near-nuclear-accident-site/ 
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3 Wildfires as Hazard for Industrial Facilities 
 
Fires in complex industrial environments pose severe risks inside and around these facilities. The 
effects and triggers of fire hazards are well known in industry, although accidents still happen. 
Nevertheless, various aspects of wildfires are special compared to common accidental fires occurring 
in an industrial surrounding. The strong influence of atmospheric conditions and the possible size of 
wildfires are only some of their special features. In comparison to many other natural hazards, wildfires 
can be influenced prior to their occurrence. This is a distinctive attribute compared to other natural 
hazards. Proper wildland and vegetation management in potential wildfire areas, for example, can limit 
the development of wildfires.  
3.1 Driving factors for wildfire development 
Like all disasters, wildfires have a history that starts well before the actual event happens. For industry 
operators it is vital to be able to assess the most basic influencing factors for wildfire development. As 
intensive wildfire research has been going on for over a century now, this section aims to provide the 
most important aspects necessary for further analysis in later sections.  
There are many different driving factors connected to wildfire development. A good overview of the 
most important drivers for wildfire development is given by the so-called “Wildfire Triangle” (Figure 6). 
Figure 6. Wildfire Triangle (Barrows, 1951) 
 
 
The Wildfire Triangle was deducted from the “Fire Triangle” well known in fire prevention. The fire 
triangle originally explains the preconditions for fire to occur (fuel, oxygen and heat). The Wildfire 
Triangle displays the three main factors for wildfire development (Barrows, 1951): 
● Fuel (amount, arrangement, moisture) 
● Weather (wind, temperature, humidity, precipitation) 
● Topography (slope or aspect of the land) 
These three main factors govern fire behaviour and are used to classify different types of wildfires: 
Fires governed by fuel (convective fires), fires influenced by wind (wind-driven fires), and topography-
driven fires. In general, higher wind speeds and upward slopes aggravate wildfire propagation. 
Regional effects like narrow canyons or valleys might also lead to more intense fires or extreme fire 
behaviour.  
According to European wildfire statistics, about 95% of wildfires are triggered by human activities, 
either by accident but also on purpose (de Rigo et al., 2017). Once ignited, the fire can spread in 
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different types of vegetation like grassland, forest, shrub, etc. In large forest areas the fire shows 
different behaviour than in pure grassland. Different types of vegetation therefore lead to different 
combustion behaviour and fire intensity. High amounts of combustible material can dramatically 
intensify the fire (Figure 7). 
Figure 7. Intensive wildfire front 
 
Source: Pixabay 
 
Wildfires in general are a natural phenomenon playing a distinct role in the earth’s ecological system. 
Although society mostly recognizes wildfires as a major problem it is scientifically understood that 
wildfires are a necessary and natural factor in some ecosystems. In a long-term perspective, the 
wildfire situation can be seen embedded in a series of different controlling factors described as 
triangles by Moritz et al. (2005). Wildfires are mainly influenced by two feedback loops between fire 
behaviour and the local wildfire situation, as well as between the local wildfire situation and the overall 
fire regime (Figure 8). 
Figure 8. Controlling factors of wildfires at different scales 
 
Source: Moritz et al., 2005 
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Fire behaviour can change in seconds, the overall wildfire situation in several days and the fire regime 
over decades. Climate change influences the overall fire regime which leads to a change in the wildfire 
situation in terms of size and behaviour. When fires themselves grow larger they are able to influence 
weather and consequently also climate in a long-term perspective. However, this is just one aspect. If 
the situation in terms of fuel or vegetation changes, the fire regime can also be influenced. In areas 
where forests are used commercially, proper forest management plays a major role also in wildfire 
safety.  
Throughout the scientific community there are different ways for the classification of wildfires. Leaving 
aside all categories and classifications, wildfires in general seem to grow bigger and burn faster than 
in the past (Halofsky et. al, 2020). An important factor in this development are local climate effects 
triggered by global climate change but there is also a significant human influence. Poor vegetation and 
land-use management and more effective firefighting measures change the natural fire periods due to 
the build-up of biomass (fuel) in wildland areas (Tedim et al., 2015). The decrease in the use of 
biomass on the industrial level and an increase of overall available biomass, managed as well as 
unmanaged, leads to more available fuel in wildland areas (Williams, 2013). So-called megafires are 
therefore a future threat in Europe. These fires have severe environmental, social and economic 
impacts mainly due to their size. They cannot be controlled by current means of response and easily 
reach a size of several thousand hectares (Binkley, 2012). Most megafires could only be controlled by 
fire services by a change in the fire weather conditions, like rain or low wind speed (San Miguel Ayanz 
et al., 2013) 
Figure 9. Smoke plume during extensive wildfire 
 
Source: Pixabay 
Megafires show some effects that are currently only seen to a limited extent in the European context 
but are occurring quite frequently in the U.S. or in Canada. According to Alexander et al. (1982) 
extreme wildfires show a higher rate of spread and intensity than average wildfires. Extreme fires also 
involve the crowns of trees; fire spread is therefore much more influenced by wind which can lead to 
an increase in ember flight and spot fires. Large fire whirls are developed and the produced smoke 
forms well-developed convection columns or plumes (Figure 9). In general, a change in fire regimes is 
also noticeable throughout Europe (de Rigo et al., 2017). 
Forests or wildland areas with a higher grade of diversity (conifers and deciduous trees) are less prone 
to extreme wildfires and fire damage (Hayward et al., 2016). As a consequence, throughout Europe 
the wildfire situation differs significantly. Vegetation, topography as well as local weather effects are 
diverse over the continent. It is therefore important for industrial plant operators to know about their 
specific wildfire situation. This includes information on the wildfire hazard around the installation, plant 
layout and internal hazards but also the topographic situation of the surrounding terrain.  
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3.2 Wildfire effects on industry 
In the previous subsection the driving factors for wildfires were discussed. Besides ecological effects, 
wildfires can also cause severe damage to structures of human origin. In areas where wildland 
intersects with human infrastructures, specific risks can arise. Wildfires for example might trigger 
accidents or even start event chains that lead to Natech events around critical infrastructures or 
hazardous industrial complexes.  
In “Wildland Urban Interfaces (WUI)”, wildland intersects with urban infrastructure. Wildland Urban 
Interfaces have a significant potential for damage and are therefore of special interest in wildland fire 
safety. A similar definition can be applied to “Wildland Industrial Interfaces (WII)”. Wildland industrial 
Interfaces mostly occur together with WUIs. For remote operations common in the oil and gas 
industry, WIIs can also appear alone. In the scientific community there is still no consensus on the 
definition of WUI and WII (Goldammer, 2019, personal communication), which makes it difficult to use 
the terms for detailed analyses of settlements or industrial facilities. On a larger (regional) scale these 
loosely defined terms give an impression of the areas most likely to be suffering from a possible 
wildfire event. The map in Figure 10 gives an example of the Wildland Urban, Wildland Industrial and 
Wildland Infrastructure Interface in Canada in 2016.  
Figure 10. Areas of interface with wildland in Canada 
 
Source: Johnston and Flannigan, 2018 
From an industry perspective, wildfires can have two main types of effects: direct and indirect effects. 
Both can lead to critical situations in a chain of events. Direct effects of wildfires can be smoke, 
flames, thermal radiation and spot fire ignition by firebrands. These effects are linked to the physical 
behaviour of an ongoing fire and will be discussed in the following paragraphs. Case studies in this 
report show that there are also a lot of indirect effects occurring in the context of large wildfire events. 
They are connected to direct effects of the fire but do not directly involve plant infrastructure. Such 
events might be linked to business activities, supply chains, emergency measures or other types of 
plant-related activities. Examples are power blackouts, shutdown of product supply or an unavailable 
workforce due to emergency evacuation.  
Most process installations are designed to withstand a certain level of thermal radiation to prevent 
rapid escalation or domino effects during fire events. Wildfires pose a specific threat in terms of 
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thermal radiation due to their nature of forming large and intense fire fronts. These fire fronts can 
reach extents of several kilometres. Large areas might be enclosed by the fire front and thermal 
radiation can reach process units from several sides simultaneously (Figure 11). Compared to 
accidental fires in an industrial surrounding this is a quite unique threat. To be able to assess the 
possible thermal loads of wildfires for single plants, further studies will be necessary.  
Figure 11. Hazard of thermal radiation 
 
 
Knowledge about possible flame length of the approaching fire fronts to create safe and defendable 
zones against wildfires is fundamental. Flame length is influenced by fuel, slope and wind and is 
directly connected to fire intensity. High wind speeds, for example, lead to larger flames and therefore 
to an increased danger of direct flame impingement on industrial equipment. Direct flame contact is 
mainly a problem for building hulls, vegetation around process equipment or combustible materials 
stored outside buildings (Pastor, 2019). The intensity of the fire line or fire front depends on the 
available amount of fuel, its calorific values and the rate of spread. Even grass fires can develop 
flames with a length of several meters under the influence of strong winds. According to Alexander et 
al. (1982) most crown fires reach fire-line intensities between 10,000 and 30,000 kW/m, large 
megafires go even beyond that. Calculating flame length for such megafires, direct flame impingement 
has to be considered as a possible hazard (Figure 12).  
Figure 12. Hazard of direct flame impingement 
 
 
Flames and thermal radiation are often seen as the largest dangers connected with fire events. 
Beyond that, wildfires can create dangerous flying embers or burning debris particles (firebrands). 
Flying embers and firebrands (Babrauskas, 2019) are responsible for so-called “spot fires” ahead of 
the actual fire front (Figure 13). In combination with the effects of smoke, they create threats to 
industrial installations well before the actual fire front arrives. Depending on the characteristics of soil 
and vegetation, these burning or glowing particles occur in large numbers and can be carried over 
several hundreds of meters. Under the influence of strong winds, firebrands and embers can attack in 
large “firebrand showers” or “firebrand storms”. There have been reports from fires where flying 
particles are responsible for up to 60% of the total loss in wildland urban interfaces (Caton et. al, 
2017a,b). The number of firebrands reaching a certain area decreases over distance to the object. 
Sparks are quite well studied as an ignition hazard inside hazardous areas or process equipment 
(Mannan et al., 2012). There is only limited data available about firebrands or flying embers that attack 
a production plant from outside. During wildfire events thousands of firebrands are carried with the 
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wind ahead of the fire front. Although there is no specific data on the ignition hazard due to embers 
entering industrial facilities, some practical considerations can be made. If embers or firebrands are 
able to enter facilities and equipment, they can create a possible fire or even explosion hazard inside 
plants. Combustible roofs, open doors or windows as well as air intakes or vents (Quarles and 
Gorham, 2019), can act as entry points for the burning or glowing particles. Large vegetated areas 
within the sites are also acting as “receiver surfaces” for embers. 
Figure 12. Hazard of flying embers 
 
 
One factor that does not directly create a danger to process installations but possibly to operations 
and the operating personnel are smoke and other toxic combustion products released during the 
combustion process. Smoke composition during wildfires can vary depending on the type of fuel 
involved. While the combustion of wood in general creates a smoke composition that is more or less 
predictable, fires at Wildland Urban Interface produce a large variety of toxic combustion products. 
Smoke does not only create a serious health threat, it can also block possible evacuation or access 
routes. Toxic combustion products are also able to enter cars, which is especially problematic during 
evacuations (Figure 14). People frequently underestimate this hazard and attempts to drive through 
thick smoke often end deadly. Smoke conditions can change rapidly under the influence of changing 
wind conditions. Emergency operations can also be hindered by large smoke clouds. 
Figure 13. Escape route during extensive wildfire event 
 
Source: Pixabay 
Fire trucks suffer from the same problems as civilian vehicles. If they are not specially equipped for the 
operation in smoke-filled areas, the combustion products can enter the personnel cabins. Specialised 
wildland firefighting vehicles are in some occasions equipped with pressurized cabins, which allow 
operation also in smoke-filled areas. Adequate breathing protection is necessary for all personnel 
operating in these areas. 
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3.3 Cascading effects 
Larger industrial complexes show an inherent potential for cascading effects due to the accumulation 
of different hazards. Fires as such are well known escalation vectors in industrial facilities, and fire risk 
is managed by different constructional, technical, organisational or response measures. Although fires 
are well known hazards in different fields of industry, fire events are generally seen as hazards 
generated inside facilities and not so much from outside the facilities. Operators and policy makers 
formulate their common goal in preventing fires or limiting spread inside facilities. Event cascades are 
analysed and broken by different safety measures, like distancing, firewalls or sprinkler systems, for 
example. In contrast, fires attacking plants from outside might lead to effect cascades operators are 
not prepared for. As mentioned above, larger wildfires might directly affect process facilities by 
radiation, flame impingement or ember flight. These events can be starting points for larger event 
chains that might lead to loss of containment scenarios or fire events that are not only limited to the 
primary affected facility or process units. Even domino effects to surrounding installations cannot be 
excluded. 
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4 Exposure of European Industrial Installations to Wildfires 
 
In the following chapter the exposure of European industries and critical infrastructures to the wildfire 
hazard will be analysed. The assessment will be based on data from forecasts, the structure of 
European industrial facilities and lessons from already ongoing initiatives.  
4.1 European forest and agricultural areas 
As mentioned in the previous sections a concrete wildfire risk occurs for industrial installations when 
wildland and industrial structures meet. Forests are an integral part of the European landscape. The 
grade of forestation differs throughout the continent and so does the composition of the forest itself 
(Figure 15). European forests are used commercially to a large extent although the ratio between 
fellings and growth has only been around 65 % during the last decades18. This means that the amount 
of biomass and therefore fuel on the European continent is constantly increasing. Around 60% of the 
European forests are privately owned. Since the European Union does not have a common forest 
policy, wildfire management is left connected to forest management measures of the Member States.  
Figure 14. European forest areas according to the European Forest Institute (EFI) 
 
Source: EFI, 2011, https://www.efi.int/knowledge/maps/forest 
 
Regarding the forest situation in Europe, the European Environment Agency (EEA) concludes (EEA, 
2016):  
“The forest area in the EU has increased by 13.1 million hectares (ha) (8.9 %) since 1990. The 
growing stock has also increased by 7.4 million m3 (38 %) over the period examined. This increase in 
growing stock is not only linked to the increase in forest area but also to a number of other factors 
across the EU, in particular high growing densities (m3/ha) in Central Europe, increased growth rates, 
low levels of harvesting and increased focus on multifunctional use of forests (ecosystem services 
from forests).” 
Besides forest areas also arable land and agricultural areas play a role in wildfire spread19. During the 
Australian bushfires in 2019 around 14% of the burnt surfaces were agricultural areas20. Figure 16 
shows the agricultural land use intensity in Europe21.  
 
18https://www.eea.europa.eu/airs/2018/natural-capital/forest-utilisation 
19https://www.agriinvestor.com/agricultural-land-comprises-14-of-total-area-burned-by-australian-bushfires/ 
20https://www.2gb.com/new-satellite-maps-reveal-the-true-destruction-of-the-bushfires/ 
21https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/agricultural-land-use-intensity-1 
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Figure 15. Agricultural land use intensity in Europe 
 
Source: European Environment Agency, 2015, https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/agricultural-land-use-
intensity-1 
Figure 17. European Wildland Urban Interfaces (Modugno et al., 2016) 
 
 
Due to the lower fuel loads of farmland or crop fires these types of wildfires might not directly 
endanger industrial installations. Nevertheless, fires in grain fields, for example, can build fire bridges 
and support fire spread over larger areas. Especially in combination with high wind speeds, also fires 
in agricultural areas might develop considerable flame length and enter industrial facilities if adequate 
distancing from wildland areas was not considered. 
The increase in European forest areas and the intensive use of agricultural areas also leads to a 
growth of Wildland Urban Interfaces and therefore also Wildland Industrial Interfaces. Modugno et al. 
(2016) analysed wildland urban interface regions in Europe. In some areas between 30 and 50% of 
the surface region can be defined as WUI area (Figure 17). Analysing these areas in context with the 
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present wildfire situation, it can be seen that until now most of the regions suffering from wildfires in 
Europe are areas with a low to medium grade of wildland urban interface.  
4.2 Climatological aspects 
Over the last decades forests have shown an increasing vulnerability against external factors like 
storms, fires, droughts, invasive species or diseases. Forecasts (Figure 18) show a significant 
increase in the number of droughts in Europe in the future22. The regions suffering the most from 
droughts will be the Mediterranean South East Europe, but also the northern parts of the continent are 
affected.  
Ongoing dry periods and the increased vulnerability of forest areas driven by climate change (Jenkins 
et al., 2014) strongly influence the fuel situation according to the wildfire triangle. Although fire danger 
also depends on the type of vegetation it can be generalized that large areas with high amounts of dry 
or dead vegetation increases fire danger. Other effects of climate change, for example the change in 
precipitation patterns, might also lead to an increased wildfire danger (de Rigo et al., 2017). Local 
extreme weather events like storms can destroy forest areas and can lead to large fuel accumulations 
due to dead or fallen trees. If not properly cleaned, these fuel accumulations lead also to more intense 
wildfires. 
Bringing together information regarding wildland with climate forecasts and wildland interface areas, it 
can be seen that fires in the Wildland Urban Interface and therefore also in the Wildland Industrial 
Interface, are an emerging risk. The regions with large areas of WUI will also face an increase in the 
wildfire danger in the next decades (Figure 19). This will also increase the likelihood for industrial 
accidents triggered by wildfires in these areas. 
Figure 18. Projected change in meteorological droughts under two climate scenarios  
 
Source: European Environment Agency, 2018, https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/projected-change-in-
meteorological-drought 
 
 
 
 
 
22https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/projected-change-in-meteorological-drought 
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Figure 19. Forecasts on forest fire danger in Europe 
 
Source: European Environment Agency, 2016, https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/average-meteorological-
forest-fire-danger-1 
4.3 Location 
Certain business activities or industry sectors are more likely to trigger events than others depending 
on the type of operation and the facilities in use. Accident reports from the EU Major Accident 
Reporting System eMARS (emars.jrc.ec.europa.eu) show that in the last decade (2008 – 2018) the 
number of major accidents and near misses was significantly higher in the oil and gas sector as well 
as in chemical production compared to other industry sectors. About one third of all chemical 
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companies in Europe are situated in south and southeast Europe (Figure 20) as well as around 50-
60% of Europe’s refinery capacities (European Commission, 2010). This brings together emerging 
wildfire danger and large numbers of facilities susceptible to such events.  
Figure 20. Location of European refineries (red: operational, gray: closed) 
 
Source: CONCAWE/Google maps 
Besides production also distribution and supply networks are at risk from wildfires. Pipelines, for 
example, connect oil and gas fields with refineries and industrial production facilities. Compared to the 
rest of Europe there is quite a dense network of local and European pipelines in East and Southeast 
Europe. A lot of these pipelines are laid underground, but there are also pipelines running through 
vegetated areas on the surface (Figure 21).  
Figure 21. Pipeline running through highly vegetated area 
 
©Cozyta - stock.adobe.com 
 
The European chemical industry is spread all over the continent. According to data from the European 
Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC, 2018), the number of chemical companies per 1000 km² varies 
significantly over Europe. While there are only 5 chemical companies per 1000 km² in Germany, there 
are around 35 per 1000 km² in Poland (Figure 22).  
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Figure 22. Number of chemical companies per 1000 km² for selected European countries (based on CEFIC, 
2018) 
 
Studies on the average number of personnel at a single company show that the chemical industry in 
East Europe shows a large number of small enterprises. Although Poland has around 11,000 chemical 
companies overall, a lot of companies have less than 50 personnel, while the average chemical 
company in Germany has around 230 personnel (Figure 23).  
Figure 23. Average workforce per chemical company for selected European countries (based on CEFIC (2018) 
 
In terms of policy it becomes obvious that wildfire safety should address also small companies with a 
high hazard potential. Smaller industrial complexes have less extensive emergency response 
capacities like on-site fire brigades and therefore also depend on external response capacities.  
Another factor to be considered is the location of the plant. Surrounding terrain can influence wildfire 
propagation. Especially in areas with steep slopes or canyons, wildfires might propagate faster and 
become more intense. Normally, industrial facilities are placed on even ground, but there are some 
exceptions also in Europe (Figure 24). For operators it is vital so assess these location effects prior to 
wildfire events. 
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Figure 24. Oil storage facility on heavily sloped terrain 
 
©pavlobaliukh - stock.adobe.com 
The constant need for risk reduction in populated areas drives production facilities and hazardous 
industrial operations towards rural areas with lower population density and more vegetation. Keeping 
in mind future wildfire scenarios, this might lead to an increase of Natech risks. Besides that, some 
industries show an inherent need to operate in remote areas. Especially mining operations or oil and 
gas production have to follow the geological circumstances and are therefore often situated in less 
densely populated remote areas. 
Plant operators focus on risk reduction within their areas of operation. In terms of wildfire safety this 
covers only one of the necessary aspects. Unmanaged or uncontrolled wildland outside facilities can 
cause a severe threat and has to be seen as a hazard as such. This also includes agriculturally used 
areas not managed in terms of wildfire safety.  
Wildland is mostly seen as a part of nature that needs to be protected and preserved. Also the 
Seveso III Directive aims at environmental protection first. This is fundamentally right but neglects the 
fact that unmanaged and uncontrolled wildland can also be a hazard for industrial installations. This 
situation might create a feedback loop culminating in possible Natech accidents. All relevant standards 
regarding wildfire safety see adequate zoning and wildland management as one of the key factors. An 
analysis of plants throughout different industrial branches in the European industry suggests that 
unmanaged wildland is in some occasions closer than 10 m to plant installations. Some installations 
even show wildland inside their area of operation. Figure 25 presents a natural gas compressor station 
that is situated in a forest area. The station is surrounded by vegetation. A safety belt with very limited 
vegetation was created approximately 20 m around the station. Outside the safety perimeter the forest 
is very dense and fuel-rich. Under certain wind conditions the plant might be endangered even by 
direct flame impingement. Vegetated surfaces inside the plant might act as receivers for ember flight 
and spot fires. 
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Figure 25. Natural gas compressor station in a wildland area 
 
Source: Google maps ©2009, GeoBasis DE/BKG 
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5 Vulnerability 
 
Industrial installations are in general vulnerable to many different types of hazards; fire hazards are in 
this context only one cause for risks. Wildfires are a specific type of hazard that might uncover 
vulnerabilities of process installations or industrial facilities not very obvious until now. Ignition sources 
carried into facilities from outside are not considered in many fire risk analyses. The following section 
will focus on the vulnerabilities of European industrial installations in the context of the wildfire hazard.  
5.1 Internal vegetation and external ignition sources 
In principle, vegetation around industrial facilities does not necessarily have to be problematic. The 
hazards of wildfires are largely manageable, as long as the wildfire situation is constantly monitored 
and adequate risk management measures are taken. In contrast, unmanaged wildland can create a 
serious threat to industrial facilities. This is also true for vegetation inside the plants. 
Figure 26. Different patterns of vegetation inside petrochemical plants 
 
Source: Google maps, 2009 
Industrial complexes are often spread over large areas. The geographic extent of oil storage tank 
farms, for example, is the result of the required safety distances to prevent incident escalation. 
Analysing various European industrial complexes, it can be seen that in some parts of the industry up 
to 75% of the total area of the production facilities are covered by vegetation (Figure 26). This is 
especially true for facilities in the oil and gas sector, chemical storage facilities and power stations. 
Vegetation inside the plant mostly consists of grassland but some facilities do even show larger, 
forest-like areas inside the installations. Compared to plants in wildfire regions in Canada or Australia 
this is quite unique.  
In Europe there is a tendency that the amount of vegetation inside a plant follows the vegetation 
pattern outside the plant. This means that less vegetation is found inside a plant when the extent of 
vegetation outside the plant is also smaller. This seems logical at first, but might also be an indication 
for why especially in the wildfire regions in the south of Europe (Greece, Spain, Italy, etc.) no major 
events involving industry have been reported due to wildfires until now. 
With an increase of the wildfire danger in the heavily vegetated areas, also the hazard of fire spread 
inside plants increases. Large vegetated areas inside the plants act as entry points for external fires or 
as receiver surfaces for firebrands or spot fires. As the case studies at the beginning of this report 
show, grassland fires can easily spread into storage or production units and act as escalation vectors. 
Statistics from 435 accidents in oil storage facilities (Figure 27) show that these installations are 
especially at risk from external ignition sources or fires (Zhou, 2016). Flying embers or fires entering 
plants are therefore a serious threat although escalation paths are specific for each plant. 
5.2 Vulnerability of buildings against external fires 
Fire safety planners try to prevent the escalation of scenarios by different measures that limit fire 
spread within buildings and also between buildings or hazardous installations. These measures do not 
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only limit the spread of fires, but also ensure the structural integrity of buildings. European building 
codes and standards (Eurocodes23) mainly deal with the structural integrity while requirements for the 
hull of buildings are regulated by the European Member States themselves. The main focus of 
European fire standards is to keep fire from spreading inside the building and to reduce loss of life 
supporting building evacuation. 
Figure 27. Distribution of ignition sources oil storage facilities (Zhou, 2016) 
 
The problem of fires attacking buildings from outside is currently not addressed by European building 
codes. Also fire spread over the hull of buildings is not commonly addressed in European standards. 
Findings from residential fire protection show that not only vegetated areas outside buildings can act 
as receivers for spark ignition, but also vents, air intakes, large openings or storage of combustible 
material around the process installations (Caton et al., 2017 a,b).  
In terms of thermal radiation, a lot of process units and installations are designed to withstand a 
certain threshold of thermal radiation to prevent rapid escalation or domino effects (Mannan et al., 
2012). These threshold levels are mostly referring to maximum permissible heat loads but do most 
often not include thermal dose effects. Although wildfires can be very intense and show also large 
extents, flame fronts are losing intensity very quickly, while for example a burning storage tank might 
be ablaze for several hours.  
Besides smoke effects, firebrands and thermal radiation, direct flame impingement has to be 
considered a hazard especially in future fires. Large flame lengths and thermal loads able to endanger 
critical infrastructure or production and storage facilities have to be expected. Analysing data from the 
European Forest Fire Information System EFFIS on the size of wildfires it can be concluded that the 
largest wildfires in Europe are currently found in the Mediterranean area. Currently only a limited 
number of megafires has been seen in Europe until now. There are strong indicators that the number 
of megafires will increase in future decades, which will also increase the hazard of direct flame 
impingement to hazardous industry and critical infrastructure.  
A common safety objective for building planners that addresses the external fire hazard as general 
threat, but especially as a threat in wildfire prone areas, is currently not present in Europe.  
5.3 Storage areas and facilities 
Storage of combustible material is a general topic in fire risk analyses due to the increased hazard 
potential posed by large accumulations of these materials. Storage of combustible material is not only 
a fire hazard itself, it can also act as a bridge for approaching external fires like wildfires (Figure 28). In 
some European industries it is common to store combustible materials in large piles or bulk storage 
areas. These areas might act as receivers for external ignition sources like firebrands if not properly 
protected. 
 
 
23https://eurocodes.jrc.ec.europa.eu 
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Figure 28. Storage of combustible materials around process plants 
 
©EdNurg - stock.adobe.com 
Besides bulk storage also other storage concepts might be endangered by approaching wildfires. 
Storage of intermediate bulk containers close to heavily vegetated areas (Figure 29) or on dry 
grassland might in case of a fire lead to loss of containment and rapid fire spread into production 
facilities (Atkinson, 2007).  
Figure 29. Storage of Intermediate Bulk Containers outside a production facility 
 
©Hadafee - stock.adobe.com 
External floating roof tanks for combustible liquids are especially threatened by flying embers. They 
are widely used in the European chemical and oil and gas industry. Guidelines like the FireSmart 
Handbook for the Oil and Gas Industry (Government of Alberta, 2008) suggest to not use floating roof 
tanks in wildfire areas. A trajectory analysis for flying ember shows that larger numbers of glowing 
particles might accumulate around the rim seal and act as ignition sources (Figure 30). 
In 2019 the Australian Building Codes Board published a national construction code handbook 
regarding the performance requirements for buildings regarding bushfires24. The handbook does not 
directly apply to the situation in industrial buildings but contains valuable information about building 
safety against wildfires. The so-called “Bushfire Verification Method Handbook” can be seen as 
 
24https://www.abcb.gov.au/Resources/Publications/Education-Training/Bushfire-Verification-Method 
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national construction standard regarding wildfire safety. A short calculation following the findings from 
Gould et al. (2008) for a floating roof tank with a diameter of 70 m (ca. 3800 m² surface area) will 
illustrate the problem of firebrands for industrial installations. Using the sample calculation from the 
Bushfire Verification Method Handbook, around 5 firebrands per m² have to be expected at a 
separation distance of 30 m to neighbouring wildland. These values refer to a eucalyptus forest, with 5 
years of no wildfire (5-year old forest). Using the same input parameters, around 20,000 embers have 
to be expected on the storage tank surface.  
Figure 30. Trajectory of embers attacking a floating roof tank 
 
 
 
5.4 Shutdown 
Shutdown and start-up procedures are operating phases with increased risk for many production 
facilities. The risk of equipment failure during start-up or uncontrolled accidental release of 
combustible material during shutdown creates specific escalation scenarios. Emergency shutdown 
operations are often connected to flaring or venting operations or rapid depressurising of process 
equipment to create safe conditions again. Plants are in general very vulnerable to disturbances in 
these phases of operation. The systematic exclusion of ignition sources during shutdown prevents 
possible fire hazards within these operations. Emergency shutdown operations in phases of ember 
attack or during the presence of large fire fronts might lead to further escalation, if, for example, 
combustible gases are vented into the atmosphere without flaring. These high stress phases for 
operating personnel might also lead to further escalation due to the influence of human factor-related 
accidents.  
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6 Wildfire Risk and Risk Reduction Measures  
 
The previous sections show that in all the three categories that define disaster risk (hazard, exposure 
and vulnerability) there is a clear indication that the wildfire risk for European industrial installations will 
increase in the future. It also becomes clear that industrial facilities are vulnerable to such events in 
general. Wildfires themselves seem to undergo a change in nature and frequency due to climate 
change, and exposure to wildfires increases via already extensive and still growing Wildland Urban 
Interface areas. A comprehensive strategy on how to deal with the issue is therefore required. 
Industrial facilities themselves do currently not experience a severe threat in terms of wildfire events, 
but as the wildfire danger is constantly increasing in the industrialised areas all over Europe, also the 
wildfire risk is increasing. The problem further increases due to the fact that building standards all over 
Europe do not specifically address wildfires as a risk for buildings and production facilities. Measures 
for risk reduction currently in place in these areas are very limited and focus mostly on emergency 
response.  
6.1 Prevention 
The wildfire threat is of increasing concern at European level but the topic itself is of course not new. 
Several countries have launched initiatives and prepared guidelines that address the wildfire problem 
at several levels. National or European policies focusing on the wildfire risk to European industries 
have not been established yet. It has proven necessary that policy makers support communities and 
industry during the adaptation to the growing danger of wildfires. An adequate level of wildfire safety 
can only be achieved if all stakeholders know their role and act according to a comprehensive 
strategic approach to wildfire safety. The “Sparking firesmart policies in the EU” report mentioned in 
the introduction (European Union, 2018b) addresses a large number of topics relevant for different 
types of stakeholders. Nevertheless, it does not include recommendations for industrial facilities, plant 
operators or policy makers aiming to prevent industrial disasters. Some findings from international 
policies already in place will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Over the last decades there have been some significant changes in the wildfire situation in the North 
American continent. Wildfires caused immense human and asset losses in North America. In the 
period from 1985 to 2000, around 400 homes were destroyed per year, the average annual cost of 
federal suppression efforts was around USD 490 million. 
Wildfire policies in the United States focus on effective wildfire suppression, which led to an increase 
in investments in emergency response (fire engines, aircraft, equipment, etc.). By the end of 2011 the 
US government spent an average of USD 1.25 billion per year increasing to an annual cost of USD 
1.85 billion in 2016. Unfortunately, the number of homes destroyed went from an average of 1354 
between 2001 and 2011 to 3456 destroyed homes per year between 2012 and 2016. In 2017 the 
numbers further increased. A paradox situation has developed in which losses increase although more 
money is spent. 
Roman (2018) suggests the following explanation:  
“Reasons for the sharp increases are multifaceted. A history of aggressively suppressing naturally 
occurring wildfires has resulted in a surplus of fuel ready to burn in the environment. A warming 
climate is drying out that excess fuel, prompting fires to start easier and spread faster while making 
them tougher to extinguish. Meanwhile, people are building more and more structures in fire-prone 
areas, often referred to as the wildland/urban interface (WUI).” 
The above statement describes quite well the interconnection between the different measures of 
wildfire safety. In the middle of the 1990s the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) started to 
develop an initiative called “Firewise USA” (Steinberg, 2011). Firewise USA tries to encourage wildfire 
safety measures from community basis upwards. It involves homeowners, community leaders, 
firefighters, land developers and other stakeholders. The program tries to teach stakeholders how to 
prepare for wildfire events and how to put into place different preventive measures on several levels, 
starting with simple measures for homeowners like cleaning gutters, mowing lawns, and retrofitting 
windows moving on to community leaders and policy makers.  
Firewise USA relies on a structured network of state liaison offices and a network of over 1500 listed 
participants (persons and organisations) that are supporting the system. It builds the backbone for 
regional initiatives and reaches also out on an international level. Regional initiatives like the “Ready 
for Wildfire” campaign by the California Department for Forestry and Fire Protection extend the range 
of the Firewise USA initiative. Ready for Wildfire provides a large variety of support material on state 
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level and uses different channels of communication. Ready for Wildfire gives advice for the 
construction of more resilient buildings, vegetation management and wildfire action plans.  
Tools like the Ready for Wildfire application for smartphones and desktop computers which contains 
checklists and information material, can directly be applied throughout a building check25. The 
application is available for free and contains information material links to wildfire information systems 
and other supporting material.  
Due to its vast forest and wildland areas, Canada has been struggling with wildfires throughout the 
past decades. Around 40 years ago an initiative called “FireSmart Canada”26 was launched, 
comparable to Firesmart USA. The initiative is also based on U.S. NFPA standards. FireSmart is 
backed by research activities like field and laboratory testing as well as modelling. As there are many 
ways to deal with the wildfire topic, the FireSmart project is set up as a multilevel initiative that includes 
national, regional and community actors to create so-called “FireSmart” communities. Like Firewise 
USA, also FireSmart has a strong focus on fire prevention and creating resilient structures especially 
in the areas of Wildland Urban Interface.  
The following areas are addressed by the initiative: 
● Education 
● Vegetation management 
● Emergency planning 
● Cross training 
● Interagency cooperation 
● Development considerations 
● Legislation and planning 
 
FireSmart is set up as a national initiative including all relevant regional and local actors like political 
decision makers, forest authorities, fires services or other local actors. FireSmart provides a large 
amount of information and support material as well as guidelines for different actors. 
With respect to industrial challenges the “FireSmart Guidebook for the Oil and Gas Industry” 
(Government of Alberta, 2008) includes strategies and specific recommendations to deal with the 
hazard of wildfire. Although the guidebook focuses on the oil and gas industry, it provides valuable 
information also for other industrial sectors.  
A basic recommendation in the FireSmart initiative is to create different zones that allow to maintain an 
adequate level of safety around a home or any other installation in a WUI, including also industrial 
sites. They build the basis for further wildfire hazard assessment and the introduction of different 
prevention measures. The zoning is accompanied by recommendations on plant layout and building 
design, emergency response, liability of operators and communication. Areas around oil and gas 
facilities should be split in the following three major zones according to the handbook: 
FireSmart Industrial Zone 1 
0-10 metres from structure(s) on the disposition. (Priority One - personnel and structures are at risk 
from radiant heat and ember transport associated with a wildfire.) 
FireSmart Industrial Zone 2 
10-30 metres from structure(s) on the disposition. (Priority Two - personnel and structures are at risk 
from ember transport associated with a wildfire.) 
FireSmart Industrial Zone 3 
30+ metres, extensive forest area surrounding individual or multiple dispositions. (Priority Three - 
evacuation routes and evacuation staging areas can be impacted by smoke and wildfire activity 
outside the disposition.) 
 
25https://www.readyforwildfire.org/ 
26https://firesmartcanada.ca/ 
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6.2 Preparedness 
Acceptable wildfire safety can only be achieved when the topic is addressed on multiple stakeholder 
levels. This is a challenge especially in terms of preparedness. For example, there is very little a plant 
operator can do against firebrands, if forest managers of the neighbouring forest have decided not to 
carry out any wildfire management measures. Zoning can limit the effects of thermal radiation or direct 
flame impingement, but firebrands can still enter the area of operation. Although wildfires might create 
a serious hazard for industrial plants, no comprehensive approach for wildfire management including 
all stakeholders is currently available in Europe. Policies like the Seveso III directive address the need 
for the inclusion of natural hazards into major accident scenarios. In Article 13 of the Directive Member 
States are requested to:  
“…ensure that the objectives of preventing major accidents and limiting the consequences of such 
accidents for human health and the environment are taken into account in their land-use policies or 
other relevant policies.” 
The directive does not directly express the need for prevention measures by competent authorities 
outside industrial facilities. This leaves most of the prevention and preparedness activities to the plant 
operators themselves and limits progress in overall risk reduction activities. External emergency plans 
established on the basis of the Seveso III directive basically focus on scenarios originating from major 
accident sites. In terms of possible Natech events, preparedness activities have to focus on external 
hazards carried into the sites, as well. Currently there are no European policies in place that foster 
comprehensive preparedness activities for industrial facilities or critical infrastructures at risk of 
wildfires.  
6.2.1 Wildfire forecasting tools 
The JRC regularly publishes reports about the wildfire situation and also runs the EFFIS web service 
(Figure 31) which provides geographical information about the wildfire danger and the current 
European wildfire situation (effis.jrc.ec.europa.eu). It offers tools for forecasts and is easy to access. 
EFFIS provides a perfect basis for a constant evaluation of the wildfire danger also around critical 
infrastructures by bringing together the most important indicators for the assessment of the wildfire 
danger. For industrial plant operators, knowledge about the current wildfire danger, as well as the 
overall fire regime is necessary to actuate adequate emergency measures. 
Additional to forest fire information systems like EFFIS, simulation systems for smoke dispersion are 
available in some countries. In the United States and in Canada real time data and simulation of 
smoke spread dispersion is available via the weather services27. These systems are a very valuable 
source of information also for evacuation planning. Regarding possible megafires in Europe, these 
tools would also be very helpful for emergency response operations in wildland urban and wildland 
industrial interfaces.  
6.2.2 Wildfire emergency planning 
The occurrence of wildfires is closely linked to human activities which often serve as ignition sources 
and origin for catastrophic wildfires. For plant operators, ignition sources can only be controlled on 
their own property; wildfire emergency plans are therefore a key factor for managing wildfire risks that 
cannot be fully prevented. Some European Member States are using automated wildfire detection 
systems linked to emergency coordination centres which act as early warning systems for wildfires 
(Engel, 2009). Since there is a tendency to convert process facilities into remotely operated production 
sites, fire detection also outside buildings and production equipment is becoming more and more 
important also for plant operators.  
The most important aspect of emergency planning is to cover personnel safety during wildfire events. 
Adequate safety measures have to include awareness raising activities among personnel as well as 
early warning and evacuation plans. The above-mentioned “FireSmart Guidebook for the Oil and Gas 
Industry” contains a lot of valuable material in terms of emergency response and response planning, 
even if the aspect of early warning is not well covered. For plant operators, linkages to such early 
warning systems in combination with wildfire information systems like EFFIS are vital tools for 
preparedness activities. 
 
27https://firesmoke.ca/resources/bsc-2014-description.pdf 
36 
 
Figure 31. The European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS) 
 
 
Source: EFFIS, JRC, 2020 
  
Very limited information is available on how to deal with process equipment and production sites 
during wildfire events. The case study from Fort McMurray showed that a lot of production facilities 
had to be shut down during the large wildfires of 2016. If not carried out early enough, shutdown 
procedures might create an additional risk of escalations due to unstable process conditions or the 
uncontrolled release of combustible material. Adequate emergency planning also reduces the 
influence of human factors. Guidelines or regulations on how to conduct shutdown operations during 
wildfire events were not found during the work on this study.  
6.3 Emergency Response  
A publicly very visible part of wildfire management is emergency response. Although emergency 
response to wildfires is quite well developed in Europe, fighting a natural hazard in combination with 
an industrial incident is not really well represented in emergency planning. Necci et al. (2018) indicate 
that Natech events are still underrepresented in emergency planning for industrial sites. Due to the 
fact that wildfires are an emerging threat in Europe, there is also a need for developing comprehensive 
emergency management capacities in terms of these Natech events.  
The large wildfires in south Europe showed that they are a significant challenge for regional and 
municipal emergency and civil protection agencies due to their size. Wildfires in Sweden in 2018 
highlighted again that even national emergency response or civil protection agencies can reach their 
limits quite quickly. Emergency response procedures for hazardous industry usually include internal 
and external emergency response activities. Although explicitly mentioned, the concept of internal and 
external measures is not only linked to the Seveso III Directive. The extent of these measures 
depends on size and location of the installation, the hazardous potential or legislative requirements. 
Large industrial complexes or chemical parks maintain strong internal emergency response capacities 
(e.g. onsite fire services), while small or medium sized companies strongly rely on external emergency 
response like municipal fire and rescue services. Past Natech accidents have, however, demonstrated 
that external emergency response resources might not be available during natural hazard events as 
they might be damaged or simply overwhelmed (Steinberg et al., 2008). The general tendency 
towards more intense wildfires leads also to a change in the fire regime. Intense fires show strong 
effects of spotting, which can cause multiple fires ahead of the actual flame front. Spot fires bind a 
larger number of emergency responders, which leads to an increase of response times for emergency 
services due to multiple calls.  
According to Modugno et al. (2016) fires in WUI stay smaller than in remote areas. Earlier detection 
and a quicker response seem to have positive effects on the size of wildfires starting in these areas. 
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The response time of emergency services all over Europe gives a very scattered picture. While some 
countries rely on a very dense system of emergency services, others show less dense structures. 
Average response times for the first crews (3-8 firefighters) to arrive vary from 5 min in urban areas to 
30 min and more in rural areas. Some countries allow 20 min for the initial response even in urban 
areas (Scandella, 2012).  
As mentioned, the size of the overall emergency situation might lead to overwhelmed external 
emergency services or at least to limited availability. This might become a larger problem in countries 
with a less dense system of emergency services or in rural areas. Industrial sites in rural areas relying 
on external emergency responders might therefore be more affected by the wildfire hazard than 
companies also maintaining on-site emergency services. It is currently not sufficiently investigated to 
which extent such a lack in capacities might influence the ability to respond to industrial emergencies 
connected to wildfires.  
Firefighting in industrial complexes requires certain strategies and tactics as also wildland firefighting 
does. Industrial fire services are in general highly specialized and tailor-made services. They are 
designed to cover scenario-based requirements of specific industrial facilities. Besides general rescue 
operations, special capacities like high cooling or foaming rates delivered at certain spots of the plant, 
the suppression of toxic clouds by water aerosols or different other specialised emergency measures 
can be found within industrial emergency services. Due to the circumstance that wildfires are 
underrepresented in hazard analysis for industrial sites, industrial emergency services are not 
specifically prepared for wildfires. However, existing capabilities, like mobile high capacity pumping 
and firefighting equipment, large volume water tankers or foam tankers, might be useful also in fighting 
wildfires at industrial sites. 
Considering that wildfires might be attacking in large fire fronts and with spot fires ahead of the actual 
front, the ability to deploy several smaller emergency units to fight large numbers of small fires within 
the plant or area of operation is especially important. Adequate prevention measures might reduce this 
need of course. Mutual aid agreements to back up industrial fire services might also be helpful, 
keeping in mind that municipal fire services or other agencies might also be heavily involved in a larger 
wildfire situation as mentioned above. 
Although public perception might be different, wildfires are mostly fought from the ground (Figure 32). 
In addition, a need for aerial firefighting capacities might arise in some situations. If used according to 
tactical standards, firefighting aircraft are a very effective tool as part of a larger combined response. 
They are used to knock down fire fronts, control the initial spread of fire or drop fire retardants (USDA, 
2016). However, aerial firefighting is rather imprecise compared to industrial firefighting. Air drops that 
miss their target can pose a threat to process installations or ground crews.  
Due to the kinetic energy of the dropped water extensive damage may occur at ground level. This 
might not be problematic for some very rigid industrial process units but at least instrumentation might 
be damaged. Also, air drops are carried out at quite low altitudes and this might interfere with industrial 
plants that also contain process equipment of a certain height (e.g. distillation columns at a refinery 
complex). Further research is needed on this topic to generate more knowledge on vulnerable process 
equipment. Aerial attacks should only be considered at a safe distance, with flight paths not directly 
leading across the plant during approach and exit of the area.  
Modules of the European Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) are currently mainly oriented 
towards active firefighting. The module descriptions demand the following tasks from Ground Forest 
Firefighting (GFFF) and Ground Forest Firefighting using Vehicles (GFFF-V) modules:  
● To contribute to the extinction of large forest and vegetal fires by using ground means. 
● To contribute to the extinction of large forest and vegetal fires using vehicles. 
Module descriptions do not explicitly include equipment or personnel for protective measures for 
industrial complexes or critical infrastructures. Although these modules are mainly deployed to actively 
tackle wildfires, in the context of larger events UCPM modules might also be used to protect 
hazardous sites. Mobile equipment for infrastructure protection, like spray systems, might be a useful 
improvement for such units. 
The UCPM offers many components that might be useful during industrial emergencies or Natech 
accidents. Besides that, there are no specific capacities for dealing with large industrial emergencies 
like tank fires, gas blowouts or major spills. Most of these specific capabilities are left to the industries 
themselves. Due to their training and equipment, Forest Firefighting Units are not able to deal with 
such emergencies. 
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Figure 32. Firefighters during fire suppression activities at a large wildfire 
 
Source: Pixabay 
Finally, several European countries rely on Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) communication 
infrastructure for emergency services. Other than analogue radio communication, digital radio 
communication systems like TETRA rely on a system of base stations. Large megafires might involve 
these base stations which could lead to problems with radio communication. An increase in the need 
for communication systems due to increased radio traffic in the course of the response measures can 
also lead to a system overload. A 2013 study on the so-called “Yarnell Hill Fire” in Arizona, which 
claimed the life of 19 firefighters, found problems with radio communication as one of the main issues 
for the catastrophic outcome of the event (Karel et. al, 2013).  
6.4 Recovery 
Large wildfires like those known from California or Australia leave vast areas affected that require 
recovery measures on multiple levels. Environmental, technical and economic impacts need to be 
dealt with. In addition, also social impacts can be observed. The range of effects is very similar to 
large industrial accidents or disasters. Both need a comprehensive set of measures in terms of 
recovery. Some insurance companies do not cover large natural events like extensive wildfires within 
their contracts by default. If not covered by insurance, problems might occur during the recovery 
phase of events. The specific damage caused by the technical aspect of the Natech event might 
enlarge the extent of the necessary recovery measures drastically.  
Recovery from Natech accidents triggered by wildfires has to deal with two different aspects of the 
event. The technical recovery on side of the plant operator is one aspect of the necessary measures. 
There is also another aspect that needs to be covered in a long-term perspective. The recovery of the 
wildland, especially of forest areas, needs to be viewed in a broader ecological context to prevent 
large wildfires or at least mitigate their development into catastrophic megafires. The build back better 
approach should not only be seen in regard to infrastructure but also in relation to a more ecological 
wildland and forest management. Around industrial facilities and critical infrastructures, at least proper 
distancing to wildland should be implemented after events occurred.  
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7 Case Study 
 
The following short case study will try to analyse the risk of wildfires for industrial facilities in the area 
of the March Thaya region between Austria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The area brings 
together different types of land use and vegetation as well as extensive industrial activities. 
7.1 Geographical location 
The river Thaya (Dyje) is a side river of the river March (Morava) and joins the March river in the area 
between Hohenau an der March (Austria) and Sekule (Slovakia). Further south, the river March 
connects Austria and Slovakia along its way towards Devίn, where it enters the Danube river. In the 
following the area is referred to as “Moravian river region” (Figure 33). 
Figure 33. The Moravian river region along the rivers Thaya (Dyje) and March (Morava) between Austria, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia 
 
Source: Google maps, 2020 
The river March forms also the border between two larger Natura 2000 Biogeographical Regions, the 
Pannonian Region in the east and the continental region in the west of the river. While the Pannonian 
region in this area is characterized by large forests, the continental region west of the river March is 
mainly used as farmland with large agricultural surfaces. In Austria the area is referred to as 
“Marchfeld”. The area of Marchfeld is not only known for the production of vegetables but also for the 
presence of strong winds over the cycle of the year. Over the last decades the Marchfeld region 
showed a strong increase of large wind parks and wind power stations. The number of wind power 
stations is still increasing and includes stations of more than 2,5 MW28.  
7.2 Industrial activities 
The geological formation in the Moravian river region led to the development of extensive oil and gas 
operations in the past 100 years (Figure 34). Exploration in the area is still going on, and oil and gas 
production wells are spread all over the whole region.  
Although peak production was reached several decades ago, there are still large numbers of 
production wells, refineries and wide-spread distribution networks located in the area. In Austria, for 
example, the total national oil and gas production covered around 5,9 % of the national crude oil 
 
28https://www.igwindkraft.at/ 
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demand and 7,2 % of natural gas demand in 201929. Most of it comes from the Marchfeld region. The 
larger part of the oil and gas production facilities in the area are located on farmland or near populated 
areas. Nevertheless, a lot of oil and gas facilities in the Moravian river region are situated also in 
forests (Figure 35).  
Figure 34. Historical oil production equipment in the Marchfeld area, active well in the background  
 
Source: Pixabay 
Figure 35. Typical layout of oil and gas production facilities in the Moravian river region 
 
Source: Google maps, 2020 
The production wells are mostly connected by small-diameter underground pipelines which lead to 
refining or separation units. For oil production classical so-called horsehead or nodding donkey pumps 
are used. They are more generally referred to as “pump jacks”. Besides exploration and production of 
 
29https://www.bmlrt.gv.at/service/publikationen/energie/energie-in-oesterreich-2019.html 
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oil and gas, critical infrastructure facilities like the major European natural gas distribution facilities are 
located in the area.  
7.3 Evaluation of the wildfire risk 
Due to the vegetation in the area the region experiences fire events over large periods of the year. 
While in the Marchfeld area mostly fires of agricultural surfaces are common, the Slovakian part of the 
Moravian river region already faced extensive forest fires. In 1992 one of the largest wildfires in 
western Slovakia to that time broke out near the city of Lozorno. The total size of the fire was around 
1174 ha and was influenced by the strong winds present in the area30. Smaller fires like in 2017 (99 
ha) are still present in the area.  
7.3.1 Hazard 
The wildfire hazard in the area originates from large forests in the Czech and Slovakian watersides of 
the Morava river. EFFIS characterizes the fuel present in this area mainly as “Closed Timber Litter”, 
“Hardwood Litter” or “Timber”. Also brush and grassland areas are present. The Marchfeld on the 
western side of the river does not show extensive fuel accumulation in the EFFIS system. The 
agricultural surfaces are not seen as possible fuels, some standalone forest areas present 
combustible material mainly described as “Hardwood Litter”. 
While the Marchfeld is a topographically flat region, especially the region of the Malé Karpaty in 
Slovakia shows sloped surfaces and dense forest areas. The hilly character of the area enhances 
wildfire development. The wind situation especially in the Marchfeld area might lead to rapid fire 
development. Fire danger of course largely depends also on precipitation and other factors that can 
vary throughout the course of the year. The year 2020, for example, had very dry periods in the 
beginning of the year which led to an increased fire danger already in March and April, which is not a 
typical fire season for this region. Figure 36 shows the fire danger map for the region on 30 April 2020.  
Figure 36. Fire danger map for the Moravian Region on 30 April 2020 
 
Source: EFFIS, JRC, 2020 
Dry periods like this are well in the range of the forecasts of 1-2 dry periods per year until 2052 and up 
to 7-12 dry periods per year from 2068 to 2100 (Figure 18). These future trends would lead to an 
increase of fire danger in the area of around 50% in the next 80 years compared to the last decades 
(Figure 19). 
 
30https://www.vtedy.sk/poziar-lozorno-pernek-brodske 
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7.3.2 Exposure 
As mentioned in the beginning, the area shows a large number of industrial facilities directly exposed 
to possible wildfire threats. According to Figure 17 (Modugno et al., 2016) around 5,2% - 9,8% of the 
Moravian river region are described as Wildland Urban Interface area. Following the Canadian 
“FireSmart Guidebook for the Oil and Gas Industry”, the minimum spacing between forest areas and 
production facilities should be around 30 m. In the Moravian river region, most production facilities 
(e.g. pump jacks) show less than 15 m distance to forest areas. Gas distribution or refining 
installations are mostly situated in larger industrial complexes with bigger distances to forest or 
wildland areas. Single storage tanks or small tank farms are spread all over the region.  
In terms of future exposure to wildfire events, there is a significant influence of the economic 
development in the region. Reports from the area show that exploration is still going on and new 
discoveries are made. As a lot of the oil and gas fields in the area are in the final phases of their 
lifetime, the overall number of production wells might decrease nevertheless.  
7.3.3 Vulnerability 
The vulnerability of the oil and gas production facilities in the area is linked to the machinery and 
production equipment used. The equipment most exposed to wildland are pump jacks used for oil 
production purposes. These pump jacks consist of electrically powered or gas-powered motor units 
and a steel rod that is lowered and lifted for pumping purposes through the so called “Tee” (Figure 37). 
Crude oil and gas are collected and transported via pipeline systems to refining units. 
Figure 37. Horsehead pump for crude oil production 
 
Source: Pixabay 
The pumping rod is sealed against the Tee via a seal or stuffing box to prevent any leakage of crude 
oil. The area of the seal and the rod itself might be contaminated with combustible residues which 
might be ignited by direct flames or intense thermal radiation. The same might happen to the motor 
unit. Depending on the gas pressure of the geological formation, failure of the seal might lead to a 
release and fire of combustible hydrocarbons. As mentioned above, many of the production wells are 
at the end of their lifetime, so also the formation pressure is very low in many wells, which limits the 
possible damage during an event. 
Besides production wells the oil and gas production sites also consist of separation or interim storage 
facilities that are connected mostly by underground piping. These facilities are distributed all over the 
area and build the hubs for the primary collection of the gas and crude produced by the wells. To 
analyse the effects of approaching wildfires for medium or small sized storage tanks we carried out a 
CFD study on the heat loads and the hazard of flame impingement. For further investigations we 
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developed and implemented a forest fire model, based on the commonly known Fire Dynamics 
Simulator code from NIST31.  
The fire model was based on the combustion behaviour of Douglas fir trees published by NIST (Mell et 
al., 2009). The tree trunks in the virtual forest area were placed 2,5 m from each other and formed a 
quite dense forest area. The fire-line intensity (kW/m) reached by the model was around 3000-7000 
kW/m depending on the wind speed chosen for simulation. For study purposes a virtual closed roof 
storage tank with a diameter of 12 m and a height of 10 m was designed. The storage tank was 
situated 20 m ahead of a forest area. Wind speeds from 1 m/s to 20 m/s were analysed in the course 
of the study. Although 12,5 kW/m² as common threshold value for thermal radiation effects was 
exceeded at wind speeds of 15 m/s and reached around 25 kW/m² at 20 m/s, the fire front was only 
sustained for very short periods of time. The most intense thermal radiation effects were only present 
for around 20-30 s. Direct flame impingement was not observed. The distancing of around 20-30 m 
from the vegetated area seemed to be adequate to limit the effects of thermal radiation or direct 
flames also in the model. Nevertheless, there is a certain hazard created by ember attack, especially 
in connection with thermal radiation and direct flames. As many facilities in the study area do not show 
adequate distancing to vegetated areas, a certain vulnerability is given. 
Figure 38. Implementation of safety zones around an oil and gas facility in the Moravian river region 
 
Source: Google maps, 2020 
Some plants in the area show distancing measures already in place. These safety zones are not 
mandatory in the area but are in some occasions implemented around facilities as shown in Figure 38. 
The plant displayed on Figure 38 shows a more or less optimum situation also in terms of emergency 
response activities. There are several access routes that lead from and to the facility, which ensures 
quick evacuation of personnel and allows emergency responders to quickly access the area of 
operation. Some plants in the area do not show such favourable conditions. 
7.3.4 Risk and risk forecast 
Bringing together the factors hazard, exposure and vulnerability it can be said that based on the 
current status of human activities in the Moravian river area, the risk of industrial accidents triggered 
by wildfires is likely to increase in the next decades. Due to the type of operation, the measures 
already implemented in some areas (e.g. distancing), and the still very low number of large wildfires in 
the area, the risk of catastrophic industrial accidents triggered by wildfires is, however, quite limited. 
The lack of adequate distancing at some plants nevertheless increases the risk to the installations 
unnecessarily. On the other hand, it is uncertain whether the extent of oil and gas production in the 
area will persist in the next two to five decades. A reduction of industrial activities in the area would 
lead to a decrease of the overall risk situation although the overall wildfire risk will increase due to 
climate effects. 
 
31https://www.nist.gov/services-resources/software/fds-and-smokeview 
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8 Conclusions and Recommendations 
Climate change is accompanied by many different social and environmental effects. One of these 
effects is the constant increase in the number of wildfires in Europe. This trend became more obvious 
to a greater public in the wildfire seasons in 2017, 2018 and 2019. A new development is that not only 
the already suffering southern regions of Europe (e.g. Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, etc.) are 
struggling with the danger of wildfires, but also regions in north and southeast Europe. Forecasts 
indicate that in the future the number of dry periods will increase also in north and southeast Europe 
which also contributes to an increase in the fire danger in these regions. The number of wildfires is an 
indicator for a large ecological change process that happens also around European critical 
infrastructure and industrial sites. 
This study analysed the vulnerability of European industrial sites against wildfires based on current 
scientific knowledge and relevant international initiatives already in place. It is a building block towards 
establishing a better understanding of the risk in the EU, and further studies are needed to understand 
the EU situation in detail. An analysis of selected cases from different fields of industry reveals that 
there have already been severe accidents and near misses due to wildfires. Although overall the 
number of such incidents is quite low, most of them happened in areas where wildfires are a common 
occurrence. It might be concluded that the number of incidents is low because adequate risk 
management strategies have been implemented in the areas where wildfires are a common and 
known threat.  
Wildfires can cause severe impacts on buildings and technical infrastructure. If no adequate measures 
are taken, thermal radiation, ember flight or direct flame impingement can cause severe damage to 
industrial infrastructure or process equipment. This can lead to the failure of process instrumentation 
or loss of containment events followed by toxic spills, fires or explosions. 
This work strongly supports the findings and recommendations for policymakers from the “Sparking 
fire smart policies in the EU” study. However, additional steps have to be taken at different stakeholder 
levels to create an integrated fire management system that also meets the requirements for the 
prevention of Natech events. Such a system does currently not exist in the EU. An adequate level of 
safety can only be reached by a balanced and integrated approach involving all relevant stakeholders. 
Consequently, the following recommendations for Natech risk management due to wildfire are 
addressed to policy makers, industry, emergency responders and academia. They must be seen in the 
context of a comprehensive programme for managing wildfire risk in Europe. 
8.1 Policy makers 
EU and national policies build the overarching framework for initiatives and measures in the fields of 
prevention, preparedness and response to disaster events in the EU. More than for many other hazard 
scenarios, wildfire risk management depends on policies with long-term perspectives. Also, since the 
size and development of wildfires show a strong connection with human activities, forward-looking 
land use planning in wildland urban or wildland industrial interface areas is needed.  
● Awareness should be raised of the hazards connected to wildfires among all relevant 
stakeholders (national, regional and local government authorities, communities and 
operators of hazardous installations) via public outreach, education campaigns, and 
knowledge transfer.  
● National policy makers should foster initiatives for multi-stakeholder activities promoting 
wildfire safety among industry operators, communities, local policy makers and other 
relevant stakeholders (e.g. through science for policy workshops). 
● European policy makers should promote the development of early warning systems or 
models to calculate fire spread in ongoing fire events as well as the preparation of 
guidance for emergency situations in industrial environments to facilitate proper and timely 
operator response (evacuation, shut down, etc.). 
● EU-level action is needed to develop regulations and associated guidance on land use 
planning in Wildland Urban and Wildland Industrial Interface regions, and to clearly define 
areas of Wildland Urban and Wildland Industrial Interface to provide a common basis for 
planning. 
● Building standards for industry and critical infrastructure operators in Wildland Industrial 
Interface regions should be put in place. 
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● European policy makers should facilitate the improvement of capabilities for industrial 
emergency response to storage tank fires, pipeline ruptures, release of toxic substances, 
etc. (e.g. large volume water monitors, spill control equipment, etc.) also within the Union 
Civil Protection Mechanism. 
● Policy makers should facilitate knowledge transfer (e.g. via knowledge exchange 
platforms) between the stakeholder communities. 
● Strategic investments in creating and improving scientific capability and know-how in the 
EU should be explored (e.g. modelling and simulation capacities, testing facilities, etc.). 
8.2 Industrial operators 
For operators of industrial facilities, it is important to know their specific wildfire situation. This includes 
information on the wildfire hazard around the installation, the plant layout and internal hazards but also 
the topographic situation of the surrounding terrain. Operators should analyse their specific wildfire risk 
and set up a comprehensive wildfire management plan if necessary. More specifically:  
● Operators should liaise with neighbouring wildland and forest owners, as well as land use 
planners and local emergency response representatives to develop common strategies for 
reducing wildfire risks in the surroundings of the facility and for preparing for impacts. 
● Wildfire risk management plans should include measures for ignition prevention, 
personnel safety in wildfire events, building and infrastructure safety, as well as 
emergency planning and response measures.  
● Clear facility shutdown policies and procedures for tackling wildfire events, including the 
definition of roles and responsibilities, should be developed and implemented. 
● Operators should evaluate internal and external emergency response capabilities in case 
of wildfire-triggered Natech events and improve response capacities if necessary (e.g. 
plant-internal firefighting capacities). 
● Plant operators should create wildfire exclusion and protection zones around industrial 
installations.  
● Industrial buildings and process equipment should be evaluated in terms of their 
vulnerability against firebrand or ember attack.  
● Storage of combustible materials outside buildings might lead to ignition during wildfire 
events. Storage concepts should include protection measures like distancing to avoid fires 
from spreading within an industrial complex.  
● Operators should be aware that even if they are currently located in areas not affected by 
wildfires, this situation might change in the future due to climate change. 
8.3 Emergency Responders 
Wildland or forest firefighting differs from industrial firefighting in terms of training, equipment and 
tactics. In addition to the variety of difficulties emergency responders normally face during Natech 
events, those caused by wildfires might bring together different groups of emergency responders 
which also drives a need for combined exercises.  
● Emergency responders should develop concepts and strategies to tackle wildfires in and 
around industrial facilities, considering the specific vulnerability of the impacted systems 
(e.g. reduced use of aerial firefighting capacities around Seveso sites). 
● Capacities for defending industrial installations against wildfire impacts should be 
augmented. More specifically, capacities for mobile and automated emergency protection 
systems should be built to protect high-hazard installations and critical infrastructures in 
case of large wildfire events. 
● Response capabilities to tackle simultaneous large-scale events combining different 
hazard and effect types (natural events and triggered loss of containment events) should 
be improved. 
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● Means of communication under partial loss of communication systems (e.g. loss of 
TETRA base stations) should be ensured. 
● European capacities in dealing with large industrial accidents like industrial fires or release 
of toxic substances should be improved. 
● Emergency plans should be ready and tested in case of an alert. 
8.4 Science 
Some scientific challenges remain which need to be addressed in the process towards integrated 
wildfire risk management. They relate mostly to forecasting and knowledge gaps on wildfire-
infrastructure interaction. 
● Wildfire behaviour modelling capabilities should be enhanced to provide local forecasts on 
fire spread in ongoing fire events to support appropriate operator response. 
● Further research should be conducted towards the interaction of industrial facilities with 
wildfire scenarios. Research activities should include prevention strategies as well as 
studies on ignition and escalations mechanisms as well as adequate infrastructure 
protection approaches. 
● Wildfire impact models on hazardous industry and critical infrastructure should be 
developed to facilitate risk assessment. 
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